Browse the atlas
Asset classes
- Transmission Line80,968
- Power Plant32,429
- Substation / Converter7,614
- Oil & Gas Field7,055
- Coal / Uranium Mine5,382
- Pipeline4,951
- Cement Plant3,513
- Data Centre3,283
- Iron & Steel Plant1,293
- LNG Terminal1,198
- Grid Storage965
- Iron Ore Mine949
- Chemical Plant868
- Interconnector704
- Export Terminal519
- Refinery279
- Storage / Tank Farm38
- Oil / Commodity Contract19
- Hydrogen Project18
- Carbon Capture (CCS)16
Chokepoints
Disruption Scenario
What happens if the Bab el-Mandeb closes?
Closing Bab el-Mandeb halts 6.2 Mb/d, which the available bypass capacity (6.2 Mb/d) can nominally absorb in full — at the cost of distance rather than volume.
Model the closure
100% haltedBypass routes
- Cape of Good Hopesea+6.2 Mb/d
The standing diversion since 2023. Adds ~9 days and bypasses Suez at the same time.
- East-West (Petroline), Saudi Arabiawithheld
Still transits cp-babelmandeb, so it cannot relieve a closure there.
Sea reroute adds roughly 9 days each way — tonnage, not throughput, is the first constraint.
- A listed bypass was credited zero because it still has to transit the closed chokepoint — it moves the barrels, but not past the closure.
- The sea reroute has no throughput limit, so the shortfall reads as zero — but it consumes tonnage. Expect freight rates, not volumes, to absorb the shock first.
Refining capacity exposed
The exposed importing countries hold 5,295 kb/d of refining capacity across 26 refineries. This is capacity that sits in exposed countries — not a claim about which refineries buy crude through this route, which is sourcing data the atlas does not hold.
Indicative planning arithmetic over published transit volumes and nameplate bypass capacity. It is not a supply forecast: it models neither price response, demand destruction, inventory release, spare production capacity, nor how quickly tonnage can physically reposition. Nameplate capacity is consistently higher than day-one deliverable capacity.